Abstract. In this paper we present a theory of optimum size and number of clients for a producer service firm performing maintenance and repair services for clients in the manufacturing sector. The theory holds that scale economies vary directly with the level of contact requirements for service delivery. This is illustrated by a model of a monopoly repair specialist in which frequency of breakdown (and therefore client demand for service) is stochastic. Comparative statics are used to draw testable hypotheses from the model which, if extended to a multisite case, may serve as a portion of a general model of producer service location.
Introduction
Although there is now a substantial literature on the growth of producer service employment across most of the advanced market economies, formal efforts at the creation of a theory of producer service location have thus far been somewhat limited (Lentnek et al, 1992a) . Though recent efforts toward spatial interaction modeling (Esparza, 1994; Esparza and Krmenec, 1994) , market-coverage analysis (Lentnek et al, 1993) , cost-minimization modeling (Coffey and Polese, 1987) , and input-output applications (Beyers, 1993) have generated good starting points for the development of a theory of producer service location (see also Harrington et al, 1991) , it is probably fair to say that the current state of the art in producer service modeling is rather underdeveloped (Esparza, 1994) . Despite a proliferation of empirical material on the growth, origins, business characteristics, and locational attributes of producer services [for a succinct review of some of this literature, see Daniels et al (1993) ], a formal body of spatial theory for this sector has yet to emerge in the academic literature.
This paper is the latest in a series of efforts (Lentnek et al, 1992b; aimed at developing a model of the optimum location of producer service firms with respect to the spatial distribution of client demand. Our goal has been (and remains) the development of a theory which can explain the optimum location and size of the service specialist based on the microeconomics of the firm with respect to three basic features of the service industry in question: (1) the frequency with which the service must be delivered to the client's site; (2) the duration of application of the service at each occurence of service delivery; and (3) the factor intensity of service application, or the level of factor inputs required at each application of the service at the client's site.
Our objective in this paper is to describe an allocation model for a single-site producer service monopolist. The model we develop in this paper takes as given the location of the producer service firm and all of its potential clients, and computes the optimal size of the service firm. We define firm size here as the number of clients contracted by the service firm and the number of identical service units or teams maintained by the specialist to deliver its service. This model is developed in the case where a clear quantitative relationship between service characteristics, distance, and costs can be established, one example being machinery repair services. An allocation model of this type can provide for a specialist an evaluation of the profitability of a chosen location, and as such it is a necessary interior calculation for a future location model of producer services.
For contextual purposes it is useful to summarize our prior model of optimum firm size in the case of known demands by individual clients (Lentnek et al, 1992b ). In that model we answered two questions. First, under what circumstances do producer service firms appear? And, second, given the appearance of a producer service firm, what is the optimum size of the firm in terms of the number of clients that it serves? This modeling effort implied that producer service firms will appear when returns to external economies of scale in service outsourcing exceed the additional costs associated with the geographical separation of clients from the service producer's location. This model also implied that the optimum size of a producer service firm is established when the spatially marginal service client yields a positive net income (profit) to the specialist, whereas the next potential client, more distant from the specialist, yields a loss.
Although our problem has been set within the context of a machinery repair service that delivers maintenance inputs to manufacturers, it should be noted that this context was chosen for illustrative purposes only. Clients might just as easily be other producer service firms, government organizations, or utility companies. It should also be noted that our modeling effort is scale independent. The model presented in this paper could apply equally to an intrametropolitan, interurban, or interregional market. From the outset, then, it should be noted that our service-to-manufacturing scenario (machinery repair) is illustrative of a potentially much broader range of conditions. Instead of responding to the problem of industrial-equipment failure in a manufacturing plant, for example, our specialist firm could be a software troubleshooter for banks or a rodent exterminator for grain storage firms. In short, the applicability of the model is not spatially or sectorally restricted to the typically intrametropolitan context of a repair service that responds to industrial demand. It is, however, based on the requirement of timely service delivered to clients' premises, and the existence of an unambiguous means of valuing the cost of any delays in the rendering of that service.
Keeping these points in mind, the model presented in this paper relaxes our earlier assumption that the service specialist knows exactly when its clients will require site visits (Lentnek et al, 1992b) . Instead, we assume only that both the clients and the specialist know the probability of service demand on any one day. In other words, only the probability density function of machinery failure is known. We assume that the probability that service will be required by a client on any one day is independent of the probability of demand for service on any other day and from any other client. Because there is a positive (albeit small) probability that failures will reach very high levels (the maximum possible is a failure of every machine on every day) beyond otherwise profitable staffing levels, we must allow the specialist to determine a profitoptimizing number of clients and service teams, using a penalty clause for inability to respond to a client under contract. Thus, this model is more complex than its predecessor, but it is also more realistic-despite the assumption that service provision comes from a spatial monopolist (we have yet to develop a model that can accommodate spatial competition).
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. In the first we review the research of other scholars in order to place our model in the context of the small but growing theoretical literature. In the next section the first stage of the model is presented, in which firms in a client industry determine their optimum output and repair service inputs under uncertainty. This is followed by the development of a model of the specialist in which the optimum numbers of clients and service teams deployed are determined (following from the outcome of the client submodel). In the final section we present several comparative statics exercises in order to illustrate some of the potential implications of the model.
Research context
The motivation for this particular modeling exercise flows from a number of recurring empirical themes in the recent literature on producer services, several of which reveal important spatial trends that warrant attention. To begin with, strategic or high-order producer services have become increasingly concentrated in the core areas of large metropolitan centres (Coffey and Polese, 1993; Daniels et al, 1993; Mitchelson and Wheeler, 1994) , suggesting an important role for agglomeration and/or urbanization economies. High-order services such as strategic management and financial consulting provide good examples of this (Michalak and Fairbairn, 1993) . On the other hand, specialized but arguably less strategic producer services (for example, equipment repair, catering, data processing, payroll or tax services) tend to be more widely distributed across the urban system, suggesting a style of locational ordering reminiscent of central place theory. Having said this, models of producer service location must often account for the fact that clients in fixed locations frequently require that service vendors travel to the client's place of business in order to deliver the service. For example, recent empirical evidence from Beyers and Lindahl (1994) suggests that this is predominantly the case for architectural, engineering, and management consulting services, and complementary evidence from Chandra and MacPherson (1994) indicates that this is also true for industrial design, marketing, and applied research and development services. Although much of the work may be conducted at the vendor's location, many of these types of services require frequent visits to the client's site for face-toface discussions. In short, many producer services can only be delivered on the basis of personal interactions at the client's location, rather than the other way round.
A second research thread in the recent literature is that part of the growth of producer services can be traced to a selective externalization of specialized functions by firms that formerly catered to their service needs via in-house provision (Goe, 1991; Raj an and Pearson, 1986; Walker, 1985) . Though this explanation of the growth of producer services can ultimately be traced to the classical logic of specialization described by Adam Smith, empirical evidence to support this argument varies considerably across sectors, regions, and nations. For example, Baro and Soy (1993) reveal that this type of externalization has recently been taking place in Spain, whereas broadly comparable surveys by Bryson et al (1993) in the United Kingdom and Beyers and Lindahl (1994) in the United States imply a much weaker role for this process. According to O'Farrell (1995) , for example, British manufacturing firms have recently been externalizing and internalizing specialized producer services simultaneously, with a marginal net trend toward vertical integration rather than outsourcing. Although regional and international differences of this ilk raise major questions concerning the origins of producer services firms, perhaps a more pertinent question from a modeling perspective concerns the trade-off between in-house provision [irrespective of whether an internal capability is (or was) present] and external provision. A formal model that describes the locational and cost ramifications of this trade-off can be found in Lentnek et al (1992b) . For now, suffice it to say that client firms (extant or potential) are presented with an internal versus external choice when it comes to certain types of service provision. This raises locational questions that ought to be of interest to economic geographers, if only because the outputs of producer service firms typically act as intermediate inputs to the technical, management, or marketing needs of other business establishments (Greenfield, 1966) .
A third empirical stream that is relevant to our modeling effort concerns interactive sets of relationships between the frequency of demand for a particular service, the duration of the service delivery period, the cost or intensity of service application, and the optimum location of service specialists in light of a given spatial distribution of clients. Here, at least three broad generalizations can be drawn from the recent literature. First, the importance of proximity between vendors and clients varies directly with frequency of demand (Baro and Soy, 1993; Daniels, 1985) . This, of course, does not hold true across all classes of producer services. For example, manufacturing companies that frequently request patent searches from legal firms or government agencies can do so by telephone, rendering the locational question somewhat trivial. On the other hand, frequently demanded services that can only be effectively delivered via face-to-face interaction will logically result in a spatial clustering between vendors and clients. Second, frequency of demand tends to vary inversely with contact duration and/or contact intensity (MacPherson, 1992) . Thus, for example, repair services for a client's photocopier machine may be demanded frequently, take little time to deliver, and cost substantially less than the cost of internally providing the service. On the other hand, services such as strategic management consulting are typically very expensive, high in duration and cost, and infrequently demanded by any given type of client. Third, the spatial implications of the two points noted above suggest a geographically restricted market area for high-frequency/low-cost/low-duration services (on the one hand), and low-frequency/high-cost/high-duration services (on the other hand).
It should also be noted that specialized producer service firms tend to cluster spatially in demand-rich locations, usually in close proximity to established sets of customers that supply repeat contracts and/or referrals (Bryson et al, 1993) . Though it is unlikely that producer service firms employ a strongly adaptive perspective as far as office location is concerned, the balance of survey evidence reveals that specialized service vendors are sensitive to the time -distance ramifications of radically different siting options at the intrametropolitan scale (Coffey and Polese, 1993) . Moreover, this may also be true at the interurban and interregional scales (Lentnek et al, 1992a) . In short, the current location pattern for producer services is unlikely to have evolved as a result of pure chance. The available empirical evidence suggests that vendors are sensitive to the geography of demand, and at a variety of spatial scales .
Last, it should be acknowledged that the 'make or buy' decision that determines whether producer service outsourcing will take place or not can be influenced by a wide range of qualitative considerations, including government regulations, risk avoidance, the need for independent third-party opinions, a lack of in-house technical expertise, and several other noncost factors (Beyers and Lindahl, 1994) . In presenting a costbased model, then, in the remainder of this paper we focus upon a restricted set of outsourcing criteria which may not fully apply to all types of producer services.
Stochastic demand for repair by manufacturing firms
We begin with a manufacturer of a standardized product based on a production line which runs in the 'up' state during working hours until a failure occurs. When the production line fails, the plant is 'down' for the sum of times required for a repair team to respond and for repair to be effected. All repairs are assumed to be to 'as new' condition. The probability of failure, given as p, is independent for each day of a planning period of length T days, subject to the condition that only one failure may occur per day.
The manufacturer seeks to choose a plant capacity of q units per day which will maximize profit over the planning period, given the requirement to ship Q units of product at the end of the planning period (see table 1 for a list of variables). The firm is a price taker, and faces a contracted unit price of P dollars for its output. Further, the Specialist submodel p Parameter: independent probability of production line failure on any day.
cf)
Variable: possible number of failures on any given day.
x(n)
Function: sum of round-trip distances from specialist to each of n clients closest to specialist. C Parameter: optimal amount client will spend on inhouse repair unit; computed in client submodel. g(</>) Function: probability that 0 failures will occur among n clients on a given day. m Parameter: average delay per unit distance between specialist and a client (days).
TV Parameter: total number of potential clients accessible to specialist. n Decision variable: number of clients (up to AO assumed by the specialist. q Parameter: optimal production capacity of the client, computed in the client submodel. qW Parameter: marginal cost to client of additional downtime (dollars per day), computed in client submodel. u Decision variable: number of teams to be fielded by the specialist to serve n clients. z Parameter: penalty paid by specialist to client each day a team is unavailable for immediate dispatch to a client's breakdown (dollars per occurrence).
manufacturer must reimburse its customer(s) S dollars for each unit of shortfall (that is, for each unit short of Q shipped) at the end of the period. This amount could represent the cost of purchasing the product from a third party to complete the shipment, or a rebate to the customer. Given the daily probability of failure, we can define the following random variables: the quantity produced over T days, and the manufacturer's shortfall, if any, at the end of the period. We note that these are transformed random variables based on the probability density function f (0) (or the probability of (j) failures) and the daily probability of failure p and the planning period of Tdays. Were pT <£ 5 (that is, p = 0.01 and T equal to a working year of 250 days), then the binomial distribution of failure counts over T days may be approximated by the Poisson distribution fW0 = WW'
with an expected value of pT.
Assuming risk neutrality, the manufacturer can expect to produce (1 -pA)qT units over its planning period, given a total downtime per failure of A < 1 days.
The firm may reduce its time to repair, and thus reduce A, by spending more over the planning period on its in-house repair unit. We assume that in-house units will have no delay in responding to any breakdown. With an internal unit, then, the firm's downtime per failure is A(C) = yC~\ where e > 0, and C is the cost of maintaining the service unit over Todays. We note that The firm's expected total revenue is P times its expected total output, or
Once the firm has selected values for C and q, its expected shortfall penalty may be calculated by summing penalties over the upper tail of f(<£), or The manufacturer will seek to choose values for two policy variables, daily capacity (q) and repair unit expenditure (C), which will maximize profits over the planning period, or
= [l-pA(C)]qPT-I(q)-S £ i{4>){Q -q[T-<f> A{C))} -C, 4> = pT+\
where l(q) is the total factor input cost over the planning period for the selected output level q. Here, profit is equal to the expected total revenue less the adjustment cost of spatial delay, less total factor cost, less the expected shortfall penalty, and less the cost of the in-house repair unit. Because of diminishing marginal returns to capital, and, by means of Young's Theorem (Chiang, 1984, pages 319-322) The first-order and second-order conditions for q are consistent when W\Atf < -I g "AZ.
The manufacturer can therefore compute an optimum combination of daily production capacity of q units per day and a repair department expenditure of C dollars over the planning period. The selection of C (the optimum service input) results in what we will term a reference downtime of A(C) days per breakdown, with no delay to repair. Applying the envelope theorem, we can state that at the optimum (that is, q = q and C = C), if the downtime were to be increased by adding a nonzero delay to repair, this added downtime will reduce the firm's profits over the period per the following:
The optimum market size for repair services We now shift our focus to a repair specialist firm which fields one or more repair teams daily from a single fixed location. The specialist seeks clients in a specified market area populated by N manufacturers each identical to the firm described in the previous section, that is, each has a capacity of q units per day and budgets C dollars per planning period for repair service. These firms are distributed in a given pattern in the market area. The specialist will offer a service contract to some or all of these firms, but it must offer its services over the planning period at significantly less than the C each firm budgets for internal provision, as it must compensate clients for added delay to repair, which for this analysis is assume to be linear in distance to the client (see table 1 for a list of variables). Regardless of the distance metric employed in the market area, we can sequence the N firms in increasing (or nondecreasing) order of distance from the specialist's location as in Lentnek et al (1992b) , allowing us to define a twice-differentiable total distance function convex in n: n k=\ where d k is the distance from the specialist to its kth closest potential client, and n ^ N is a specified number of clients the specialist may select to take on. x(n) represents, therefore, an approximation of the total round-trip distance the specialist's team(s) would travel were each of n clients to be serviced once. We note that this function is convex in n (Lentnek et al, 1993) .
We assume that all repairs are conducted by a team which departs from the specialist's offices for the client, effects needed repairs, and returns to the office. We also assume that the repair technology employed is identical with that available to its clients. We further assume that the specialist will offer its services to a nearer prospective client before it offers to contract with a more distant one, and that if offered the kth prospective client will purchase a repair contract for the T^day planning period provided the contract price is CpTmd k Wq 9
or less, where pT is the firm's expected number of failures over the planning period, m is the average delay (in days) per unit distance, and Wq is the marginal cost to the client of an additional day of delay to repair. The specialist must select some number of clients n ^ TV to service, and it must also select a number of teams u ^ n to staff and equip at a cost of B dollars per team over the planning period. We note that B is not necessarily equal to C, because B may include imputed overhead. Clearly, were the specialist to decide to field n teams, there would be no economies of scale and there would be no basis for the specialist to survive; similarly, were n -\ the same situation would exist.
The specialist's contract provides a penalty clause against failure to service a client promptly. For each failure to have a team ready to deploy immediately to a client call, the specialist agrees in advance to indemnify its client by z dollars.
The specialist therefore selects a number of clients and a number of teams to maximize its profit. Total revenue is increasing in the number of clients but is offset both by the adjustment of contract price for increased delay to repair, and by increased marginal service delivery costs, both of which are consequences of the increasing marginal distance of successive new clients. Service production costs are linear in the number of teams. The expected penalty is the cost per incident times the expected number of incidents given n and u over the contract period. We note from above that the breakdowns are assumed to be Poisson, and that if g((/>) is the probability of cj) breakdowns of n clients per day, the expected number of breakdowns is the mean of g (0), or pn. We assume that the penalty will apply whenever the actual number of breakdowns exceeds u and the magnitude of the penalty is z dollars times the difference. The expected penalty may then be written as ZT\" 4>z(4>)&4>.
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Service delivery costs may be written as the total of the round-trip distances to each of the specialist's clients times the expected number of service trips over the planning period, or
where r is the average cost of a team's travel in dollars per distance unit.
The specialist's profit function may then be written as
H = pT(\mqW+r).
Taking derivatives, we see that
First-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied if
C-Hxl B and u = zTg(n) ' zTg(u)'
Because first cross-derivatives are zero, the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied when the second derivatives are negative, that is, when g(n)+ng'(n) > -^f, and u < ^-.
The above presentation shows that, given a repair expenditure and production level optimal to each of N potential clients, a single-branch monopoly repair service will operate profitably within the given market area provided that h < T V and rw</>)d</>.
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nC > Hx(n) + Bu + zT
One prerequisite for the very existence of the repair specialist is the operation of economies of scale. These economies exist when the number of teams is less than the number of clients, given the above conditions, which would obtain if
' where the numerators are the net marginal profit in the number of clients and the marginal cost of teams, respectively.
Implications of the model
In its present form, this model can be used to generate theoretical expectations with regard to the effects of parameter changes upon the profitability and size of the producer service firm. These changes can be viewed as (1) characteristics of different producer service market segments or industries, or (2) differences between the 'before' and 'after' states of a market segment or industry after an exogenous change in technology or operating environment has occurred. The outcomes of these exercises in comparative statics can be considered testable hypothesis. Holding profit constant, each of the following statements reflects directions of change in selected parameters. Some of these statements might inform the design of future empirical work, as well as modeling efforts.
Statement h
A significant decrease in the transport rate for service teams (r) will result in the specialist servicing more clients. A smaller decrease would raise profits but would not result in the specialist adding clients. A decrease in / * decreases H; this raises profits and if by a large enough amount permits an increase in n, as the specialist adds the next potential client at the spatial margin.
Statement 2.
An increase in the cost of fielding a service team (B) may in the short-run result in fewer teams being fielded, and/or fewer clients being served. This increase, which may occur because of outside factors such as a shortage of skills, will decrease profits. In the short run, the specialist could meet this decrease in profits by reducing the number of service teams (u), but the savings from this action would be offset by the size of the penalty cost; depending on the industry's parameters the firm may not be able to reduce the number of teams fielded without also decreasing the number of clients (n) it is committed to serve. It should be noted when considering longer run effects that many circumstances which might change B may also change C: C reflects the cost structure of repair regardless of who performs it, whereas B reflects these costs plus other costs unique to the service specialist, such as overhead. Were the cost of repair technology itself to increase, longer run effects would depend on how their effect on C would be reflected in the clients' adjustment to these costs.
Statement 3.
An improvement in machinery reliability will in the short run result in more clients being served. In the short run, a decrease in p will have an effect similar to a decrease in r, as both would decrease H, and result in an increase in the number of clients taken on by the specialist. For reasons similar to the case of increased team cost, however, the longer run result of an exogenous improvement in machinery reliability is more difficult to determine. The independent probability of failure helps determine both the clients' optimum output level and repair service budget. Once these have both adjusted it is not clear without explicit parameter values what new optimum numbers of clients and teams would result. For example, given more reliable equipment, future capacity might be planned with this information in mind, and hence production capacity before allowance for breakdowns, q, might be lower than previously, and the shift in client output rate would result in different optimum values in the second stage of the model. These comparative statics exercises imply statements about the real world concerning the effects of changes to an industry. For example, suppose that repair methods improve over time so that maintenance, repairs, and upgrading requirements lessen per contract period. The theory suggests that the clients operating this equipment will tend in the short-to-medium term to contract with fewer suppliers of these services, each of whom will be larger and will service more dispersed points. In another example, suppose that a segment of the medical instrument industry experiences a period of very rapid introduction of new equipment. The servicing and programming of this equipment becomes, at least for a while, more complex. The number of individuals versed in this new technology increases more slowly during this time than does the demand for their services. Naturally, their wages rise, and the optimum size of repair firms shrinks. Although we have not modeled competition, we note that decreasing the optimum size of repair firms lowers barriers to entry to this market segment, permitting the segment to grow to a larger number of smaller firms if the pace of rapid change continues.
These exercises in comparative statics may also provide useful statements about differences between industries or market segments. For example, one might expect the market segment for the emergency overhaul of heavy equipment to have fewer but larger specialist firms each with wider spatial coverage than a segment offering periodic adjustment of lighter industrial equipment. Although we would expect basic pricing of these services to also differ, we can also state that the first segment could be characterized by much lower frequency and by higher duration and factor intensity (measured by team cost) than the second segment, and would therefore be delivered by fewer, higher cost service teams covering a wider market area.
In another example, suppose that there are three kinds of transport rates available to producer service industries: local (intrametropolitan), regional (between metropolitan airports which are not hubs or directly with the nearest hub) and, last, national (between national hubs). Also suppose that the transport rate decreases as geographical scale increases. Then, we should expect that, for different segments of a service industry which are roughly similar in contact requirements but operate at different scales, the difference in transport rates alone would lead us to expect larger firms with more clients with increasing geographical scale. Implied strongly (but not as a direct result of this model which is purely allocative) is that each scale of market will produce a locational orientation towards the center of that transportation system. Specifically, we would expect that local producer service firms providing daily delivered service to clients would locate at especially accessible nodes on the intrametropolitan -interstate highway network. Regional firms would demonstrate a tendency to locate with respect to accessibility to the local airport. National firms would locate in cities which are the location for major hubs of the airline industry and also (at the intraurban scale) near these airports.
The theory itself is a work in progress. Our next task is to introduce an explicit locational component to the model to produce a location theory. Beyond the locational issue, we have yet to formulate a theory of spatial competition which is applicable in this context-and this is a vital task for a theory attempting to explain the behavior of small, intensely competitive, private firms. Nevertheless, the theory is now sufficiently developed to make applications to empirical research feasible and desirable. For now, several implications of the current model converge with the general thrust of at least three empirical streams in the recent literature in the field. First, producer service specialists tend to locate in close proximity to their major clients. Though many types of services can be delivered via electronic means (or by mail), strategic and/or urgently required services typically require face-to-face discussions at the client's location (Coffey, 1993) . This implies that vendors will attempt, wherever possible, to optimize their location with respect to client demand. Second, it is clear that producer service buyers will continue to outsource as long as suppliers are able to meet certain quality, response-time, and/or cost conditions. With the possible exception of service quality, the cost and response-time variables suggest an important role for spatial proximity between sellers and buyers . Last, the geographic scale over which any given producer service firm can operate appears to depend upon an interactive mix between service cost (price per job), service duration (time spent per job), frequency of demand per client, and the urgency of demand on the part of clients. To complicate matters from a modeling perspective, all of the above must be modified by the locational status of the vendor (single-site versus multilocational or branch organization), the size of potential clients, and many other factors-including spatial competition. In short, we have presented a partial model that fits a restricted set of conditions. In this regard, the present model offers a rudimentary starting point for a more complex but hopefully more realistic family of locational models that might advance the interests of producer service analysts in the near future.
